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I. INTRODUCTION
a. Scope
This memo surveys the international criminal courts’ legal standard for confirming
indictments. By looking at the Statutes, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“RPE”), and case law
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, (“ICTR”), the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), Special
Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), and Extraordinary Chambers in Courts of Cambodia
(“ECCC”), this memo provides guidance to the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
(“STL”) for drafting successful indictments. In addition, this memo reviews the applicability of
procedural standards for confirming an indictment at the international courts. Finally, this memo
lists 14 recommendations for the Prosecutor to follow when drafting successful indictments.
b. Summary of Conclusions
i. Prosecutors face a more thorough review of their indictments from
Pre-Trial Judges at the international criminal courts today than
fifteen years ago when the ICTY confirmed its first indictment.
Prosecutors at the international criminal courts must submit more precise accusatory
instruments in order to satisfy the legal standard for confirming an indictment. Fortunately for
Prosecutors, a large library of jurisprudence now exists to guide their drafting of indictments.
The growing wealth of jurisprudence is a benefit for Prosecutors because many past indictments
at the international criminal courts have not met today’s legal standard regarding specificity and
precision. According to international legal scholar Gideon Boas, during the early ICTY trials,
most indictments were reviewed and confirmed “without significant attention by the reviewing
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judge.”1 This is not the scenario today. Perhaps because of criticism consistent with Boas’
argument, now indictments at the international criminal courts face tougher judicial scrutiny. As
a result, Prosecutors at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon should submit concise accusatory
instruments.
ii. Most international criminal courts share a core requirement that
indictments be “a concise statement of the facts of the case and the
crimes charged”2 and establish a “prima facie”3 case.
International criminal courts understand the term ‘prima facie case’ to mean that “the
material facts pleaded in the indictment constitute a credible case which would (if not
contradicted by the accused) be a sufficient basis to convict [the accused] of that charge.”4 A
further explanation of prima facie case includes “sufficient evidence that provides substantial
ground to believe that the person committed the crime charged.”5 Such language should be read

1

Gideon Boas, The Milosevic Trial: Lessons for the Conduct of Complex International Criminal Proceedings,
(“Milosevic Trial”) 94-99 (1994). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 11]
2

Article 18(4) of the ICTY Statute [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 8]. See also Prosecutor v.
Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on Two Motions Alleging Defects in the Form of the Indictment,
(“Alleging Defects”) 12 May 2009, para. 14 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 22]; See also, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Naletilic et al., Case No. IT-98-34-A, Judgment, 3 May 2006, para. 23 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at TAB 27]; Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgement, 28 February 2005, para. 27
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 26]; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 29 July
2004, para. 209[reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 17]; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-9516-A, Appeal Judgment, 23 Octobre 2001, para. 88. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 25 ].
3

Article 18(4) and 19(1) of the ICTY Statute [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 8].

4

Vladimir Tochilovsky, Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Courts and the European Court of Human
Rights, 51 (2008). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 13].
See also Prosecutor v. Kordic et al., Case No. IT-95-14-I, Decision on the Review of the Indictment, 10 November
1995, page 3. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 23].
5

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB ]
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in concurrence with jurisprudence from both human rights and international criminal courts,6
meaning the Prosecutor must “offer concrete and tangible proof demonstrating a clear line of
reasoning underpinning its specific allegations”7 in indictments.
iii. International standards require that an indictment set out the
material facts of the case with enough detail to inform the defendant
clearly of the charges against him so that he may prepare his defense.8
The indictment should articulate each charge specifically and separately and identify the
particular acts in a satisfactory manner. If an accused is charged with alternative forms of
participation, the indictment should set out each form charged.9 Furthermore, it is now readily
acknowledged that “shorter indictments are often more precise, clear and unambiguous”, and this
has the effect of limiting the number of preliminary motions filed by defense counsel after
confirmation of indictments.10
iv. While the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL review indictments ex parte, the
ICC and ECCC provide the defense an opportunity to file motions
and present live testimony.
6

Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09) Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February 2010, para. 35. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at TAB 32 ]
7

Abu Garda, Confirmation, para. 35, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 32]. See also Lubanga (ICC01/04-01/06-803tEN), Decision on the confirmation of charges, 29 January 2007, para. 39. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at TAB 37].
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-A, “Judgment”, Appeals Chamber, 29 July 2004 para. 2009. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at TAB 17 ].
8

9

ECCC (001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02)), Decision on Appeal Against Closing Order Indicting Kaing Guek
Eav alias “DUCH”, 5 December 2008, para. 47. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 38].
10

Alex Obote-Odora, Drafting of Indictments for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Criminal Law
Forum 12: page 336 (2001). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 15]. Compare also Prosecutor v.
Bizimana et al. (Case No. ICTR-98-44-I), August 28, 1998 (108 page indictment ) and Prosecutor v. Musabyimana
(Case No. ICTR-2001-62-I), May, 2001. (8 page indictment).
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The ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL review indictments ex parte; the ICC and ECCC invite both
parties to participate in the confirmation hearing. At the other international criminal courts, the
reviewing judge simply passes judgment on the accusatory instrument as provided to him by the
Prosecution. The judge can (i) confirm it; (ii) dismiss it; or, (iii) send it back to the Prosecution
for amendments.
v. Prosecutors can defeat motions arguing defects in the indictment by
pleading or pleading “sufficiently, the material facts as well as the
type of connection between the material facts and the accused.”11
A Prosecutor can defeat such defenses by submitting indictments that do not simply
“repeat the wording [of the relevant Statute] without providing further particulars of the alleged
acts…” but instead describe the accused acts “precisely.”12 At the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
(“STL”), the Prosecution is likely to face challenges to the form of the indictment and the mode
of liability charged to the accused. If an accused is charged with alternative forms of
participation, the indictment should set out each form charged because the tribunals have drawn
distinctions on the level of particularity required in indictments depending on the alleged mode
of liability, as the materiality of such facts as the identity of the victim, the place and date of the
events for which the accused is alleged to be responsible and the description of the events
themselves, necessarily depends upon the alleged proximity of the accused to those events.13

11

Gideon Boas, Milosevic Trial, 96. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 11]

12

Gideon Boas, Milosevic Trial, 96. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 11]

13

ECCC (001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02)), Decision on Appeal Against Closing Order Indicting Kaing
Guek Eav alias “DUCH”, 5 December 2008, para. 47, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 38].
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II.

SURVEY OF THE LEGAL AND PROCEDURAL STANDARDS FOR
CONFIRMING INDICTMENTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS.
a. The international legal standard for confirming an indictment requires “a concise
statement of the facts of the case and the crimes charged”14which establishes a
“prima facie”15 case.
While some international criminal courts use slightly different language to articulate the

international legal standard for confirming an indictment, the international criminal courts, with
one exception16, share a core requirement that indictments contain a concise statement of the
facts of the case and the crimes charged which establish a prima facie case against the accused.
A prima facie case is one that reveals sufficient evidence showing a “substantial ground to
believe that the person committed the crime charged.”17
i. ICTY establishes the “prima facie” legal standard for confirming an
indictment.
The phrase prima facie appears in both Article 18(4) and Article 19(1) of the ICTY Statute
and has the same meaning for each. Article 18(4) authorizes the Prosecutor to forward a concise
indictment to the judge after the Prosecutor has determined that “a prima facie case”18 exists.
Following that step, Article 19(1) states that the judge to whom the indictment was sent should
review it and only after the judge is “satisfied that a prima facie case has been established by the
14

Article 18(4) and 19(1) of the ICTY Statute. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 8]. See also
Karadzic, Alleging Defects, para. 14, infra, footnote 2, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 22].
15

Article 18(4) and 19(1) of the ICTY Statute. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 8].

16

SCSL requires case summaries with indictments. See supra, footnote 122.

17

Article 61(1) of Rome Statute. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 5].

18

Vladimir Tochilovsky, Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Courts and the European Court of Human
Rights, 51 (2008). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 13]. See also Article 18(4) of ICTY Statute,
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 13].
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Prosecutor” 19 should he confirm it. Additionally the ICTY’s jurisprudence supports the
argument that “prima facie” shares the same meaning for both the Prosecutor’s Article 18(4) and
the reviewing judge’s Article 19 test.
ii. The genesis of prima facie’s meaning at the ICTY comes for International
Law Commission’s commentary.
A clear understanding of judicial interpretation for prima facie at the ICTY reaches back
to Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald’s20 decision in Prosecutor v. Kordic. In Kordic, Judge
McDonald grounded her interpretation of prima facie on a 1994 International Law Commission
(ILC) commentary.21 The ILC argued that prima facie means “a credible case which would (if
not contradicted by the Defense) be a sufficient basis to convict the accused of the charge.”22
Judge McDonald agreed with the ILC and applied this interpretation of prima face to Article
19(1)’s language. 23
At least one Trial Chamber decision at the ICTY deviates from Judge McDonald’s
interpretation. Although subtle, this interpretation argues that the prima facie standard
[established in Article 19] is more exacting than [the standard established in Article 18].24 Judge

19

Article 19 of the ICTY Statute. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 8].

20

Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald served as President of the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/7441.

David Hunt, “The Meaning of a “prima facie Case” for the Purposes of Confirmation”, published in Essays on
ICTY Procedure and Evidence: In Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Edited by Richard May, page 142, (2001).
See also Prosecutor v. Kordic et al., Case No. IT-95-14-I, Decision on the Review of the Indictment, 10 November
1995, page 3. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 9]
21

22

Id. at 142.

23

Id. at 143.

24

ICTY, RPE, 47(b) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 2] See also Antonio Cassese, International
Criminal Law, 415 (2003). See FN 5 where Cassese notes that in Rajic (review of the indictment), Judge Sidhwa
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Rustam Sidhwa in Prosecutor v. Rajic, held that Rule 47(B) [replacing prima facie language
with ‘substantial grounds to reasonably believe’] was “explanatory or declaratory of Article
18(4)” but not for Article 19(1) and therefore should adopt the same” interpretation given by
Rule 47(b) for Article 19(1) as well.”25 After this opinion, a November 1995 indictment in
Prosecutor v. Mrskic based the confirmation of the indictment on the “reasonable grounds to
believe” language and failed to mention the prima facie case language of the Articles.26
Nevertheless, the majority of jurisprudence lands on the side of prima facie language as the
standard. Moreover, the ‘substantial grounds to reasonably believe’ language appears more
explanatory of prima facie than converse to it.
Judge David Hunt, former Trial Judge at the ICTY, published an article on the meaning
of prima facie case where he argued that prima facie case “must mean the same thing” for each
of the following27:
a) Purposes of presenting an indictment to a judge of a Trial Chamber in accordance
with Article 18(4)
b) Purposes of confirming an indictment in accordance with Article 19(1)
c) Purposes of issuing an arrest warrant (also pursuant to Article 19).

held that this requirement means that if is sufficient for the Prosecutor to point to ‘such facts and circumstances as
would justify a reasonably or ordinary prudent man to believe that a suspect has committed a crime (at 1065).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 10].
25

David Hunt, “prima facie”, 141, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 9].

26

David Hunt, “prima facie”, 142, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 9].

27

Id. at 142.
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Judge Hunt’s analysis, if measured by the jurisprudence of the international criminal
courts, appears to be the majority view on the issue of prima facie in reference to the
indictments. Moreover, each international criminal court establishes a standard for both the
Prosecutor and reviewing judge for moving the indictment along in the process on its way to
confirmation or dismissal. Rule 47 at the ICTY outlines this procedure.
b. Rule 47 establishes the procedure for confirming an indictment.
The procedure for confirming an indictment at the ICTY is governed by Rule 47 and is
outlined below. First, if the Prosecutor believes that the case shows a “substantial grounds to
believe” that the accused is guilty of the charges, then the Prosecutor forwards to the Registrar an
indictment for confirmation together with the supporting materials. Second, the Registrar
forwards the indictment and materials to the Designated (reviewing) Judge. The Designated
(reviewing) Judge then informs the Prosecutor of the date set for reviewing the indictment. Next,
the reviewing Judge examines each count and the supporting materials to determine whether a
prima facie case exists against the accused.
The Designated Judge follows a two step process for reviewing the indictment. First, the
judge makes a subject matter jurisdiction determination based on the crimes alleged in the
indictment. Second, the judge examines the “materials accompanying the indictment.”28 Judge
McDonald draws the comparison of this step with the function of an “examining magistrate (juge
d’instruction) or a grand jury” whose purpose is to protect the defendant from “frivolous”

28

Prosecutor v. Kordic et al., Case No. IT-95-14-I, Decision on the Review of the Indictment, 10 November 1995,
page 3. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 23]
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prosecution. 29 Judge Hunt argues convincingly that at this point, prima facie case means whether
there is evidence, if accepted and not contradicted by the accused, upon which a reasonable trier
of fact could30 be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused on the particular
charge in question.31 Judge Hunt’s could standard recalls that the reviewing judge has not
assigned probative weight to evidence; instead the reviewing judge views the material and makes
a determination as to whether it is supportive of the charge.
After this review, the Designated Judge may (i) request additional materials from the
Prosecutor, (ii) confirm each count, (iii) dismiss each count, (iv) adjourn the review to give the
Prosecutor more time to modify the indictment.32
If the indictment is confirmed, the indictment is retained by the Registrar and copied and
translated into appropriate languages. Following confirmation, the Judge may issue an arrest
warrant and the suspect takes the status of an accused. Finally, if an indictment is dismissed, the
Prosecutor is not precluded from subsequently brining an amended indictment based on the same

29

Id at 3.

David Hunt, “prima facie,” 145, Note that Judge Hunt agrees that the basic test of whether a prima facie case
exists should be whether, if accepted, the evidence is such that a reasonable Trial Chamber could convict (and that it
is for the Trial Chamber to say later whether the evidence should be accepted.” However, Judge Hunt also notes that
“in making this assessment, I suggest that, where the sole evidence upon an essential ingredient of the offence has
been conceded by the witness to be false or is unreliable upon its face, that evidence may be disregarded.”
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 9].
30

Prosecutor v. Delic, Case No. IT-04-83-PT, Decision on the Prosecution’s Submission of Proposed Amended
Indictment and Defence Motion Alleging Defects in Amended Indictment, 30 June 2006, para. 76; [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at TAB 20]; Kordic, Decision on the Review of the Indictment, page 3, [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at TAB 23].
31

32

ICTY Rule 47(F) RPE. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 2].
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acts if additional evidence is produced. 33The reviewing judge “performs these alternative acts in
a hearing that is ex parte, that is, without the suspect or his counsel, and is held in camera.”34
c. Decisions on motions to the court in Karadzic and Popovic help articulate the
prima facie standard at the ICTY.
The ICTY’s jurisprudence interpreting the meaning of a prima facie case remains consistent.
In 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Karadzic held in Decision on Two Motions
Alleging Defects in the Form of the Indictment (“Alleging Defects”) that the Accused’s motions
questioning the prima facie case against him should be reviewed against the Prosecution’s duty
to set forth “concise”35 indictments. As a result, in Alleging Defects, the Chamber concluded that
the “further details”36 requested by the Accused should be provided to the Accused.37
i. “A concise statement of facts of the case and the crimes charged” means a
minimum level of specificity and precision in the indictment.
The Prosecution bears the duty to “set out in the indictment a concise statement of the facts
of the case and the crimes charged.”38 The ruling in Alleging Defects held that such statements
must be interpreted “in conjunction” with the rights of the accused.”39 In the Alleging Defects
motion, Karadzic argued that the indictment was defective because it lacked particulars
33

Rule 47(F) of ICTY RPE. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 2]. See also Cassese, International
Criminal Law, 415 (2008), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 10].
34

Cassese, 415, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 10].

35

ICTY Statute, Article 18(4). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 8]

36

Karadzic, Alleging Defects, para. 32. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 22 ]

37

Id at 32.

38

Id at 32.

39

Id at 32.
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concerning members of the Joint Criminal Enterprises (JCEs) for which he was accused.
Karadzic wanted the Prosecution to provide the particulars in an appended schedule and for the
Prosecution to offer a written explanation if it was unable to meet that standard. In a JCE charge,
for instance, Karadzic argued that the Prosecution must provide the names of the ‘non-member
participants’ if it has that information. In paragraph 28 of the decision, the Chamber held that as
related to the JCE in this instance the listing of key participants was sufficient. However, the
Chamber also found that the Prosecutor should add further details concerning the identity of JCE
members and physical perpetrators requested by Karadzic. In this case, the Chamber suggested
that the Pre-Trial Brief would suffice as the place to make these additions.
As the Pre-Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Popovic explains, a concise statement of facts
within an indictment means the indictment should contain “a minimum degree of precision,
failing which the accusation against a person may not be upheld.” 40 As a result, the facts set
forth in the indictment face “a floor below which the level of information must not fall if the
indictment is to be valid as to its form.”41 For instance, the indictment should “articulate each
charge specifically and separately and identify the particular acts in satisfactory manner.”42 If an
accused is charged with alternative forms of participation [command or superior responsibility],
then the indictment should set out each form charged.43 Moreover, different modes of liability
40

Prosecution v. Popovic et al., Case No. IT-05-00-PT, Preliminary Motion of General Militic Regarding Defects in
the Form of the Indictment, 9 January 2006, para.14 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 28]…citing
Kvocka, Judgment, para. 14, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 26 ].
41

Popovic et al., para.14, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 28.]

Delic, Decision on Motion by the Accused Hazim Delic…,para. 14, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
TAB 20].
42

43

Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgment, para. 129. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 23].
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require different “levels of particularity” since specifics like identity of the victim and location
and date of the events at issue depend upon the Accused’s proximity to those events.44 The main
reason for clarity lies with the rights of the accused—if an indictment is imprecise, the accused
will be unable to understand the charges it sets out in the accusatory instrument.45
ii. The ICTY bases its requirement for concise indictments on the
foundational rights the accused.
The purpose for pleading a concise indictment is based on the rights of the accused. For
example, in Alleging Defects, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that the main purpose of the
indictment is “to notify the accused in a summary manner of the nature of the crimes for which
he is charged and to present the factual basis for those accusations.”46 The reason for notifying
the Accused is so that the Accused can prepare an adequate defense against the charges. To this
point, “the Prosecution is under an obligation to plead the material facts underpinning the
charges in the indictment” and these facts must reach a threshold degree of specificity.47 For
example, in Alleging Defects, the Pre-Trial Chamber noted that the determination of whether a
fact is material “depends on the nature of the Prosecution’s case.”48 Furthermore, the “degree of
specificity” of material facts depends on “the nature and scale” of the crime charged and the
“proximity of the accused to the relative events.”

44

Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, para. 210 and 211, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 17].

45

Popovic, para.14, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 28].

46

Infra footnote 2.

47

Infra footnote 2.

48

Infra footnote 2.
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III. The ICTR establishes a prima facie legal standard for confirming an indictment
similar to the ICTY’s standard of ‘concise’ statement that is supported by
‘sufficient evidence.’49
As with the ICTY, the term prima facie case appears twice in the Statute of the ICTR
(Article 17(4) and Article 18(1)) 50 but is never defined therein. Moreover, like the ICTY, the
term prima facie case is not used in Rule 47(B) of the ICTR to describe the procedural standard.
Instead, like the ICTY, Rule 47(B) of the ICTR uses “sufficient evidence to provide reasonable
grounds for believing” language.51 Alex Obote-Odora, senior legal advisor at the ICTR, argues
that “shorter indictments are often more precise, clear and unambiguous,” and this has the effect
of limiting the number of preliminary motions filed by defense counsel after confirmation of
indictments.52
a. The meaning of “prima facie” at the ICTR is similar to the ICTY’s interpretation.
At the ICTR, the Trial Chamber has held that “prima facie” as used in Article 17(4) of
the Statute means to signify a “sufficient amount of evidence, justifying a reasonable suspicion
that the inductee did in fact commit the crime for which he is charged.”53 “In an effort to clearly

49

Rule 47(B) of ICTR

50

Similar to ICTY, Article 17(4) of ICTR establishes the prima facie standard for the OTP to forward the indictment
to the Trial Chamber and Article 18(1) of ICTR establishes the legal standard of prima facie case for the reviewing
judge to confirm the indictment.
51

Alex Obote-Odora, Drafting of Indictments for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, (“ICTR
Indictments”)Criminal Law Forum 12: 339, 2001. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 15].
52

Alex Obote-Odora, ICTR Indictments, 339, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 15]; referencing
indictment in Prosecutor v. Musabyimana (Case No. ICTR-2001-62-I), May, 2001.
53

Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-T, Decision on a Preliminary Motion Filed by Defense
Counsel for an Order to Quash Counts 1, 2, 3, and 6 of the Indictment, June 30, 1998, para. 6-8. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at TAB 30].
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distinguish prima facie from other language, one early case at the ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu,
argued that prima facie and sufficient evidence may not mean ‘conclusive evidence’ or ‘evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt.’”54 Nevertheless, the Ruggiu language appears to be an outlier. For
instance, the Trial Chamber stated in Ntakirutimana that clearly the term “sufficient evidence in
Rule 47 (B) could be deemed to require conclusive evidence or evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt for the presentation of an indictment…” Moreover, the ‘sufficient evidence’ language of
Rule 47(C) “set[s] forth the name and particulars of the suspect, and a concise statement of the facts
of the case and of the crime with which the suspect is charged.”55

b. The ICTR procedural standard mirrors the ICTY standard.
The procedure for confirming an indictment at the ICTR mirrors the ICTY. Additionally,
at the ICTR (and ICTY), “there is no requirement for a formal hearing or extensive oral
proceedings to confirm an indictment.”56 The Designated Judge makes his determination based
“primarily on the information contained”57 in the submitted materials produced both at the time
of confirmation hearing or submitted earlier to Registrar in accordance with the rules. In
addition, the review of the confirmation is held ex parte. Prior to the confirmation of the

54

Id. at 339. See also Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. 97-32-T, Decision, May 24, 1999, para. 7. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at TAB 31].
55

56

57

Rule 47(C) of ICTR RPE. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 2].
Alex Obote-Odora, ICTR Indictments, 342, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 15].
Rule 47 RPE, ICTR,[reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 2].
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indictment, the accused is listed only as a mere suspect, and it is only after confirmation does the
status of a person become an accused. 58
c. Case law of the ICTR clarifies meaning of ‘reasonable grounds’ within the
context of prima facie.
Case law from the ICTR helps clarify the understanding of the prima facie standard by
lending explanation to the text. First, the phrase ‘substantial grounds to reasonably believe’ is
explanatory of term prima facie. Second, within this phrase, the Trial Chamber opined that the
word “reasonable” in Rule 47(B) is to be associated with “fairness, moderation, sensibility and
sound judgment”.59 Furthermore, in Ntakirutimana, the Trial Chamber stated:
The term reasonable grounds can be interpreted as facts and
circumstances, which could justify a reasonable or ordinary prudent
person in believing that a suspect has committed a crime. There must be
facts, which raise a clear suspicion that the suspect is guilty of committing
the offence, for reasonable grounds to exist. The facts must address the
essential elements of the offence with which the suspect is charged.60
Aside from the explanation of prima facie, the ICTR case law is consistent with ICTY
jurisprudence regarding the purpose of confirming an indictment. First, the indictment exists to
“ensure that the allegations against the suspect do constitute an offence within the jurisdiction of

58

59

Alex Obote-Odora, ICTR Indictments 343, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 15].
Ntakirutimana, Preliminary Motion to Quash, para. 6. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 30].

60

Alex Obote-Odora, ICTR Indictment, 337, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 15]; citing
Ntakirutimana, Preliminary Motion to Quash, para. 6. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 30].
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the Tribunal.” 61 Second, a clear indictment helps to “inform the suspect in a clear and concise
manner the nature of the charges against him.”62
IV.

While the ICC shares major similarities with the ICTY and ICTR related to the
legal standard for confirming an indictment, the ICC uses a distinct
confirmation hearing process to determine whether an indictment should be
forwarded to trial.

The ICC borrows language from the ICTY and ICTR to establish its legal standard for
confirming an indictment, but the ICC’s confirmation hearing procedure is distinct from the
ICTY or ICTR. The recent decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber to decline the indictment against
Abu Garda for crimes allegedly committed in Sudan provides a clear example of how the ICC
applies its legal and procedural standards to the confirmation process.
a. The ICC abandons the “prima facie” case language favored at the ICTY and
ICTR and instead relies on “substantial grounds to believe” language that
resembles the text of Rule 47(B) at the ICTY and ICTR.
The ICC’s legal standard for confirming an indictment is drawn from Article 61 of the
Rome Statute. The text of Article 61(5) of the Rome Statute is nearly identical to Rule 47(B) of
both the ICTY and ICTR, but the interpretation of the language by the Pre-Trial Chamber adds a
clear human rights dimension to the language by stating that the legal standard for “substantial
grounds to believe” should be read in accordance with Article 21(3) of Statute and on the basis
of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.63 For example, in Abu Garda the Pre-

61

Id. at 337.

62

Id. at 337.

Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09) Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, (“Confirmation”) 8 February 2010, para.
35, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 32].
63
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Trial Chamber notes that its interpretation of “substantial grounds to believe” is undertaken in
light of human rights jurisprudence.
Human rights jurisprudence encourages a totality of the circumstances approach to
reviewing indictments. First, in Soering v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) gave some clarification to the text by stating that it could mean “substantial
grounds have been shown for believing.”64 Supporting this clarification, in Mamatkulov and
Askarov v. Turkey, three dissenting judges stated that “substantial grounds to believe” should be
defined as “strong grounds for believing.”65 In Lubanga, the ICC interpreted the clarifications of
the substantial grounds to believe to mean that the “substantial grounds to believe standard must
enable all the evidence admitted for the purpose of the confirmation hearing to be assessed as a
whole.” 66 More precisely, the Lubanga Chamber meant that in order “for the Prosecution to meet
its evidentiary burden, it must offer concrete and tangible proof demonstrating a clear line of
reasoning underpinning its specific allegations.”67
Another clarification of the prima facie interpretation came in Prosecutor v. Bemba. In
that case, the court set forth its understanding of the term “substantial” in the context of Article

Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN), Decision on the confirmation of charges, (“Decision on Charges”) 29
January 2007, para. 38 and 39, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 37].See also European Court of
Human Rights, Soering v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 1989, Application No. 14038/88, page 468.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 42].
64

65

European Court of Human Rights, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Judgment of 4 February 2005,
Applications Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99 para. 7 of dissent. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 41].
66

Lubanga, Decision of charges, para. 39, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 37].

67

Abu Garda, Confirmation, para. 35. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 32].See also Lubanga,
Decision on charges, 29 January 2007, para. 39. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 37].
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61. The Chamber wrote that it understood “substantial” to be mean “significant,” “solid,”
“material,” “well built,” “real,” and rather than “imaginary.”68
b. The procedure of the ICC is governed by Article 61 of the Rome Statute and Rule
121 of the court and provides for a confirmation hearing which brings together
both parties and (i) allows for the admission of evidence; and, (ii) allows both
parties to be heard.
Article 61(1) of the Rome Statute establishes that the Pre-Trial Chamber should hold a
hearing to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to go to trial.69 Similar to the
ICTY and ICTR, the purpose is to protect the defendant against abusive and unfounded
accusations. The Prosecutor is entitled to rely on documentary or summary evidence and need
not call witnesses.70 Also, within a “reasonable time prior to the hearing, the ‘person’—note that
the Rome Statute avoids using the colloquial term “accused” until after the confirmation
hearing—is entitled to be provided with a copy” of the ‘document containing the charges.’71
The ICC’s intention is that the confirmation hearing be held in public, however certain
sessions “may take place in closed session (in camera) in order to protect witnesses.”72
Additionally, the hearing should be held in the presence of the accused and his or her counsel. 73

68

Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, para. 29. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
TAB 34].
69

William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 273 (2004). [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at TAB 14]
70

71

Rome Statute, Art. 61 (5). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 5].
Schabas, ICC, 273 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 14].

72

Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Decision on the Schedule and Conduct of the Confirmation Hearing, 7 November
2006. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 36].
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Next, the Pre-Trial Chamber may make orders concerning disclosure of information for
the purposes of the hearing.74 At his stage, the Defense has “no general and unlimited right” to
view documents that are in the possession of the Prosecutor and that may be relevant to the
case.75 For the purposes of disclosure, only Prosecutor and defense counsel, without the Registry,
exchange materials.76
Then, at the confirmation hearing itself, the Prosecutor is required to support each
specific charge with ‘sufficient evidence to establish substantial ground to believe that the person
committed the crime charged.’77 The Prosecutor can do this by: (i) documentary evidence; (ii)
summary evidence.
The ICC is distinct from the ICTY and ICTR because the Defense is invited to participate
at the confirmation hearing –the Lubanga case. If the Defense elects to lead evidence, Rule 121
requires the defense to provide the Pre-Trial Chamber with a list of what it intends to produce at
the confirmation hearing.78 In Lubanga, a judge of the Pre-Trial Chamber spoke of the duty of

73

Schabas, ICC, 273 and 274, The Pre-trial chamber may hold this confirmation hearing in the absence of the
accused either at the Prosecutors request or at its own initiative. Such an ex parte hearing will be justified where the
accused has waived his right to be present or where the accused has fled or cannot be found. In such cases the
Chamber is to satisfy itself that all reasonable steps have been takes to secure the person’s appearance and to inform
him or her of the charges and the fact that such a confirmation hearing is to be held. The Pre-Trial Chamber may
allow an absent accused to be represented by counsel when this is in ‘the interest of justice.’ [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at TAB 14].
74

Id. at 275.
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Schabas, ICC, 276, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 14].
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Schabas, ICC, 273 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 14].
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Rome Statute, Art. 61(5) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 5].
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ICC RPE, Rule 121(6). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 3].
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‘the parties’ and clearly considered that both Prosecutor and defendant were required to
participate in disclosure.79
At the close of the confirmation hearing, the Pre-Trial Chamber “may conclude that there
is sufficient evidence and commit the person for trial.”80 But the Pre-Trial Chamber may also
decline to confirm the charges, a decision that does not prevent the Prosecutor from returning
with a subsequent request on the basis of additional evidence. The third option: Pre-Trial
Chamber may adjourn the hearing and ask the Prosecutor to provide further evidence or to
pursue further investigation or alternatively to amend the charges because the available evidence
shows a crime different from the one charged.81
c. The Abu Garda confirmation hearing provides clear jurisprudence on the legal
and procedural standards for confirming an indictment at the ICC.
On February 8, 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber at the ICC declined to confirm the
indictment of Abu Garda for crimes allegedly committed in Sudan because the Chamber was
“not satisfied that there are substantial grounds to believe that [Abu Garda] can be held
criminally responsible as either a direct or indirect co-perpetrator” for the crimes alleged.82 The
Pre-Trial Chamber grounded its determination on the consideration that the testimony of
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Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), 15 May 2006, paras. 37 and 42. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 35].

80

Schabas, ICC, 277, 278, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 14].

81

Schabas, ICC, 277, 278. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 14].

82

Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 232. [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at TAB 32].
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witnesses submitted by the Prosecution shared “inherent inconsistencies” in their statements and
the witnesses even contradicted each other’s testimony.83
The Abu Garda confirmation process provides a clear example for STL of an alternative
and participatory procedural standard for confirming an indictment at an international criminal
court. First, in Abu Garda, the Prosecutor submitted an application under Article 58 requesting
the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest or alternatively a Summons to Appear.84 Second, the
Chamber issues a summons to appear to the accused.85 Thirdly, when the accused appeared, he
was informed of the crimes he was alleged to have committed and his rights pursuant to the
Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.86 Fourth, a date for confirmation hear was set
[five months later].87 Then the court issued a ruling regarding the disclosure of evidence between
the parties and communication with the Chamber for purposes of the confirmation hearing.88
Fifth, the Prosectuor filed its document containing the charges together with a list of evidence.89
Prior to the confirmation the Chamber issued an order related to time extensions and
authorization for victims to participate in the hearing.90 Sixth, the confirmation hearing was held.
Both the Prosecution and Defense presented evidence which included live testimony of three
83

Abu Garda, Confirmation, para. 230. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 32].

84

Abu Garda, Confirmation, para. 3. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 32].

85

Abu Garda,Confirmation, para. 4. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 32].
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Abu Garda, Confirmation, para. 5. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 32].
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Abu Garda, Confirmation, para. 5. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 32].
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Abu Garda, Confirmation, para. 6, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 32].
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Abu Garda, Confirmation, para. 8, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 32].
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Abu Garda, Confirmation,, para. 11, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 32].
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Prosecutor witnesses and one Defense witness91 as well as opening and closing statements.92 The
parties were granted the opportunity to file a document which addresses any issues raised during
the confirmation hearing which were of relevance to the decision of the Chamber.93 Seventh,
after an exacting scrutiny of all the evidence, the Chamber determined whether it was thoroughly
satisfied that the Prosecution’s allegations were sufficiently strong to commit the accused for
trial. In this regard the Chamber considered the various witness statements in the context of the
remaining evidence admitted for the purpose of the confirmation hearing.”94
It is worth noting that Professor William Schabas, international criminal law scholar and
director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National University of Ireland, raised the
issue of whether, “from the standpoint of the defendant” it is worth admitting evidence at the
confirmation hearing.95 Schabas argues that “while the Statute invites the defense to present
evidence at this stage, it is not obvious that contradictory evidence adduced by the defence can
have any effect upon the determination of the existence of the ‘sufficient evidence.’96
Furthermore, Schabas noted, the Pre-Trial Chamber “may well decide that whether or not the
defense evidence raises doubts about the validity of prosecution evidence is a matter for the trial
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Schabas, ICC, 277, 278. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 14].
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Abu Garda, Confirmation, para. 13, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 32].
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Abu Garda, Confirmation, para. 14, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 32].
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Lubanga, Decision on Charges, para. 39, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 37].
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Schabas, ICC, 277, 278 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 14].

96

Id at 277, 278.
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court” and not an issue for the confirmation hearing.97 Clearly, in Abu Garda, the Pre-Trial
Chamber decided that the evidence did not reach the threshold to send it to trial.
It is unclear whether the Abu Garda decision provides weight to the argument that the
defendants should submit witnesses during the confirmation hearing to negate the testimony
provided by Prosecution’s witnesses. Although Abu Garda provided one witness, the ICC’s
ruling did not turn on evidence provided by Defendant’s witness, but instead on the
inconsistencies in the Prosecution’s witnesses. It was the testing process as related to the “value”
of [the Prosecution’s] evidence which was essential to the dismissal of the indictment.98
Nevertheless, a Defendant could benefit from participating in the indictment if a
Chamber found the Defendant’s submissions so convincing that it negated the Prosecution’s
admissions. On the other hand, the Defendant may hurt his case if he chooses to participate in the
hearing, admits testimony, but then indictment goes forward because this could tip the
Defendants hand he’ and give the Prosecution more time to prepare evidence that refutes the
testimony of Defendant’s witness.
V.

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) refers to an
international legal standard for confirming charges and has Co-investigative judges
issue “closing orders.”
Although the Internal Rules are silent on the legal standard, the confirmation of charges

at the ECCC follow the procedural standard set forth in Internal Rule 67.99 However,
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Id at 277, 278.
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Id at 277, 278.
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ECCC, Internal Rule 67: Closing Orders by the Co-Investigating Judges (Amended on 1 February 2008 and 9
February 2010) (1) The Co-Investigating Judges shall conclude the investigation by issuing a Closing Order, either
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Nevertheless, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in Duch sets forth the ECCC’s interpretation of
the international legal standard for confirming an indictment.
a. The Pre-Trial Chamber refers to an international legal standard for confirming
charges against an accused in Prosecutor v. Duch.
Although the ECCC’s rules and statute do not establish a legal standard for confirming
charges, Rule 67(2) provides guidance by stating that an indictment must set out “the identity of
the Accused, a description of the material facts and their legal characterization by the coinvestigating judges, including the relevant criminal provisions and the nature of the criminal
responsibility.”100 The Pre-Trial Chamber then compares this language with what it labels “the
international standard.” 101
According to the ECCC, the international legal standard requires that “an indictment set
out the material facts of the case with enough detail to inform the defendant clearly of the

indicting a Charged Person and sending him or her to trial, or dismissing the case. The Co-Investigating Judges are
not bound by the Co-Prosecutors’ submissions; (2) The Indictment shall be void for procedural defect unless it sets
out the identity of the Accused, a description of the material facts and their legal characterization by the CoInvestigating Judges, including the relevant criminal provisions and the nature of the criminal responsibility; (3) The
Co-Investigating Judges shall issue a Dismissal Order in the following circumstances: a) The acts in question do not
amount to crimes within the jurisdiction of the ECCC; b) The perpetrators of the acts have not been identified; or c)
There is not sufficient evidence against the Charged Person or persons of the charges; (4) The Closing Order shall
state the reasons for the decision. A Closing Order may both send the case to trial for certain acts or against certain
persons and dismiss the case for others; (5) The Co-Prosecutors, the Accused and Civil Parties must be immediately
notified upon issue of a Closing Order, and receive a copy thereof. The order is subject to appeal as provided in Rule
74. Any Civil Party whose appeal against the denial of his or her Civil Party application is successful pursuant to IR
23(5) joins the single, consolidated group and accordingly, any Civil Party appeal of the Dismissal Order that is still
pending; (6) In the Closing Order, the Co-Investigating Judges shall make any necessary decisions concerning
sealed items and, for this purpose, may grant leave or invite the submission of amicus curiae briefs. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at TAB 1]
100

101

ECCC Internal Rule 67(2) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 1].
Blaskic, Judgment, para. 209. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 17].
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charges against him.” 102 The purpose of this standard is so the accused may prepare his
defense.103
Furthermore, the indictment should articulate each charge specifically and separately and
identify the particular acts in a satisfactory manner. If an accused is charged with alternative
forms of participation, the indictment should set out each form charged. 104 The international
tribunals have drawn distinctions on the level of particularity required in indictments depending
on the alleged mode of liability, as the materiality of such facts as the identity of the victim, the
place and date of the events for which the accused is alleged to be responsible and the
description of the events themselves, necessarily depends upon the alleged proximity of the
accused to those events.105
b. The ECCC uses a unique procedure to confirm charges.
The procedure followed by the ECCC to confirm charges is set forth in Rule 67. The
ECCC is unique in that it uses Co-Investigative Judges and Co-Prosecutors. Rule 66 states that
when the Co-Investigating Judge concludes the investigation, they should notify all parties and
make the decision public.106 If the Co-Investigative Judges reject the further investigative action,
they must provide a reasoned response. The rules permit all parties to file appeals within 30 days
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Id. at para. 209.
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ECCC (001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02)), Decision on Appeal Against Closing Order Indicting Kaing
Guek Eav alias “DUCH”, 5 December 2008, para. 47, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 38].
105
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period. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 1]
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of initial notice. After any such appeals period has expired, the Co-Investigating Judges forward
the case file to the Co-Prosecutors. When the Co-Prosecutors concur with the Co-Investigating
Judges, they issue a written submission and return the case to the Co-Investigative Judges within
45 days if a charged person is detained and within 3 months from the date they receive the file in
other instances. The Co-Prosecutors may request the Co-Investigating Judges either indict the
accused or dismiss the case.
The Rules of the ECCC establish standards for Closing Orders. First, the Closing Order
must “set out the identity of the Accused, a description of the material facts and their legal
characterization by the Co-Investigating Judges, including the relevant criminal provisions and
the nature of the criminal responsibility.”107 Next, the Closing Order shall state the reasons for
the decision. Furthermore, the Co-Prosecutors, the Accused and Civil Parties must be
immediately notified upon issue of a Closing Order, and receive a copy thereof. The Closing
Order may be appealed. In addition, in the Closing Order, the Co-Investigating Judges shall
make any necessary decisions concerning sealed items and, for this purpose, may grant leave or
invite the submission of amicus curiae briefs.108
c. The ECCC relies on the international legal standard for confirming an indictment
when it confirms the closing orders against Duch.
On August 8, 2008, the Co-Investigating Judges at the ECCC issues a Closing Order
indicting Duch109 on charges related to crimes committed during the regime of the Khmer Rouge
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Internal Rule 67(2),[reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 1]
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Internal Rule 67(2). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 1].
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ECCC, DUCH”, para. 4, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 38].
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in Cambodia. The Co-Prosecutors appealed the Closing Order filed by the Co-Investigating
Judges because the Co-Prosecutors sought to add (i) the crime of homicide and torture pursuant
to the 1956 Penal Code, and (ii) the failure to indict Duch for committing all the crimes that
occurred at S-21 via participation in a joint criminal enterprise.110 In the view of the CoProsecutors, the “Co-Investigating judges failed to draw all the required legal consequences”
from the facts submitted in the legal indictment and therefore the Co-Prosecutors sought to
amend the Closing Order “to add legal offenses and a mode of liability.”111 The Chambers issued
Decision on Appeal against Closing Orders Indicting Duch (“Closing Orders”) on December 5,
2008.
Like an indictment, at the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, a Closing Order sets forth the charges
against the accused.112 However, Rule 67 does not establish a legal standard for issuing a Closing
Order. The ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber noted that Internal Rules provide “no further guidance” for
making a determination on a Closing Order and therefore “the Pre-Trial Chamber will apply
international standards.”113 According to the Pre-Trial Chamber in Duch, the international legal
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ECCC, DUCH, para 26, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 38].
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ECCC, DUCH, para. 30, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 38].

ECCC, DUCH, para. 40, explaining that “In the Glossary of the Internal Rules, the word “Indictment” is defined
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trial.” [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 38].
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standard for confirming an indictment should set forth “each charge specifically and separately”
and “identify the particular acts in a satisfactory manner.” 114
The Pre-Trial Chamber drew a clear distinction between the standard required for
accused who “personally carried out the acts” and an accused that “planned, instigated, ordered
or aided and abetted in the commission” of crimes.115 In the instance where the accused
personally carried out the crime in question, “the identity of the victim, the place and
approximate date of the alleged criminal acts, and the means by which they were committed shall
be set out ‘with the greatest precision.’”116 For those scenarios where the accused planned,
instigated, ordered or aided and abetted in the commission of the alleged crimes, “the ‘particular
acts’ or ‘the particular course of conduct” on the part of the accused which forms the basis for
the charges in question must be identified.117
The Pre-Trial Chamber applied the international legal standard to the accused in Duch
and for the charge that Duch himself committed torture the Chamber declined to confirm the
Closing Order because it was unable to “identify from [paragraphs of Closing Order] precise
facts that would permit a charge of committing the domestic crime of torture.”118
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VI.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone grounds confirmation of charges on Rule 67 of
the RPE but the Statute for the SCSL is silent on confirmation.
The SCSL abandons both the “prima facie case” and “substantial grounds to believe” legal

standard for confirming indictments in favor of a lesser, “would, if proven, amount to trial
offenses” standard. The decision to confirm an amended indictment in the trial of Charles Taylor
provides some guidance on the SCSL’s application of the rule to cases before the court.
a. Critics argue that the SCSL incorporates a lower level of judicial review over its
confirmation process because “unlike in indictments before the ICTY and ICTR,
there is no requirement for a case to meet the prima facie standard at the
confirmation stage.”119
Two senior associates form the International Center for Transitional Justice (“ICTJ”)
have expressed concern that evidence admitted at the time of the confirmation hearing has been
insufficient and that additional investigations on certain cases have been needed.120 The legal
standard at the SCSL is derived from Rule 47of the RPE at the SCSL; the Statute of the Special
Court is silent on the issue of confirmation of the indictment. Rule 47 noticeably drops the
“prima facie” or “substantial grounds to believe” language. Instead, the rule only states briefly
the requirements to be listed in a successful indictment. Rule 47(C) states that an indictment
should contain “the name and particulars of the suspect, a statement of each specific offense of
which the names suspect is charged and a short description of the particulars of the offence.”
Finally and perhaps most notably, the SCSL rule adds a unique requirement that the
indictment should be “accompanied by a Prosecutor’s case summary briefly setting out the
119

Tom Perriello and Marieke Wierda, International Center for Transitional Justice: The Special Court for Sierra
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allegations he proposes in making his case.”121 The case summary accompanies the Prosecutor’s
submission of the indictment to the Registrar. This process is outlined below.
b. SCSL’s procedure for confirming indictments is distinguished from other ad hoc
Tribunals because Rule 47 includes a requirement of a case summary.
In order to confirm an indictment at the SCSL, the Special Court takes the following
steps. First, the Prosecutor forwards the indictment to the Registrar for approval by a Designated
Judge. In addition, the Prosecutor should also submit a “case summary” that explains the crimes
he will attempt to prove against the Accused. Then the Registrar is responsible for submitting the
indictment and accompanying material to the Designated Judge for review. Next, the Designated
Judge reviews the indictment and accompanying material to determine whether the indictment
should be approved. Rule 47(E) sets out a two-fold test for whether the Designated Judge is
satisfied that the charges against the accused: (i) the indictment charges the suspect with crime or
crimes within the jurisdiction of the SCSL; and (ii) the “allegations in the Prosecution’s
summary would, if proven, amount to the crime or crimes as particularized in the indictment.”122
Finally, the Designated Judge may confirm or dismiss the indictment. If the judge
approves at least one count in the indictment, then the indictment should move forward with the
approved counts to trial and the Judge may issue, at the request of the Prosecutor, orders and
warrants for the arrest of the accused. 123

121

SCSL RPE 47(c), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 6].

122

Rule 47(e) of SCSL RPE, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 6].

123

Rule 47(f) (g) and (h) of SCSL RPE, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 6].

37

c. In Prosecution v. Taylor, the Designated Judge confirmed both the indictment and
amendments to the indictment guided by jurisprudence from the Trial Chamber at
the SCSL.
The Designated Judge in Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor confirmed the indictment against
the accused using a language distinct from other international criminal courts. For example, in
Taylor, the Designated Judge confirmed the indictment, stating that “I am satisfied that [the case
against Taylor] would, if proven, amount to triable offenses.” 124 This standard noticeably
abandons any prima facie case or sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe
language. Instead, the test is if proven could be triable. Such a standard recalls the debate Judge
Hunt raised when defining prima facie125. In that instance, Judge Hunt concluded that prima
facie meant ‘the reasonable trier of fact could be satisfied’ of guilt of the accused. Although the
Chamber’s language in Taylor omits prima facie, the standard appears in line with that of other
international courts.
Despite the similarity between Judge Hunt’s analysis and the language in Taylor, the
SCSL states that its legal standard for confirming indictments deviates from other international
criminal courts. In Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, the
Appeals Chamber stated that the two prong test established by Rule 47(E) of the SCSL is
distinguished from the legal standard at the other international criminal courts because the SCSL
rules “does not, as in certain other courts [ICTY, ICTR, ICC, ECCC] require a judicial finding

Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Decision on Prosecution’s Application to Amend Indictment and
On Approval of Amended Indictment, 16 March 2006, para. 11. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB
40].
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of a prima facie case: the judge is concerned only to ensure that the particulars which the
Prosecution claims it can prove would amount to a triable offence” (emphasis added).126
Thus, by its own admission, the Appeals Chamber views its standard as lighter than that
required by the ICTY, ICTR, ICC or ECCC regarding the confirmation of indictments and in
Taylor the Designating Judge expressly followed this standard.
III.

APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS TO
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
a. The legal standard at the STL

Since the Prosecutor at the STL is yet to submit an indictment, the legal standard for
confirming an indictment at the STL is governed entirely by the Statute and RPE. Article 18 of
the STL Statute provides the Pre-Trial Judge with powers to confirm or dismiss indictments. In
Article 18(1), the Pre-Trial Judge reviews the indictment and, “if satisfied that a prima facie case
has been established by the Prosecutor,”127 then the judge confirms the indictment. Article 18
also gives the Pre-Trial Judge the authority to issue warrants.128 Rule 68 of the RPE at the STL
governs the legal and procedural standard for confirming indictments and mirrors closely the
language of the ICTY and ICTR. Rule 68(F) establishes the prima facie case standard for
confirmation of indictments by the Pre-Trial Judge at the STL.
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Since the STL lacks its own jurisprudence, the collective case law of the international
criminal courts offers guidance to the Prosecutor for drafting indictments that: (i) satisfy the
prima facie legal standard likely to be applied by the reviewing judge; and, (ii) overcome the
defendant’s motions arguing defects in the material facts pleaded or the form of the indictment.
The following issues provide guidance to the Prosecution for drafting successful
indictments.
1. The Prosecutor should assume that the phrase ‘prima facie’ shares the same meaning
throughout the rules of procedure and evidence at the STL.
Rule 68 (F) uses the phrase prima facie to articulate the legal standard for determining
whether a case exists against the accused and Rule 68 (G) uses prima facie to determine whether
the case falls within the jurisdiction of the STL. In Kordic, Judge McDonald applied a definition
to prima facie case: it means “a credible case which would (if not contradicted by the Defence)
be a sufficient basis to convict the accused of the charge.”129 In addition, Judge Hunt argued
convincingly that prima facie holds the same meaning for both the Prosecutor preparing an
indictment and the reviewing judge determining confirmation of the indictment. Based on his
argument and the jurisprudence of the international criminal courts, it is likely that the STL
Chambers will give the same meaning to prima facie in each rule. However, the Prosecutor
should strive to reach the reviewing judge’s prima facie standard regardless of whether two
separate interpretations for prima facie can be applied because the goal of the Prosecution is to
have the indictment confirmed. As a result, the Prosecutor should build an indictment which
meets the reviewing judge’s most burdensome prima facie standard.
129
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2. The Prosecutor should include a ‘concise statement of material facts’ that reveals
sufficient evidence showing a ‘substantial ground to believe’ that the person
committed the crime charged.”130
Rule 68(D) requires a concise statement of facts as part of the indictment. This phrase is
not defined by the STL. However, the Trial Chambers have held that it means “a brief statement
of facts which is comprehensive of expression.”131 More specifically, case law from the ICTR
suggests that the phrase means ‘the specific conduct of the accused constituting the offense.”132
The concise statement should also incorporate the accused’s ‘nature of the responsibility alleged
against him or her.’ When the Prosecutor drafts the concise statements of material fact, emphasis
should be paid to the nature of the responsibility attributed to the accused is key because an
accused may “bear individual responsibility” or superior responsibility.133
The ICTR offers guidance for which words are ‘too vague’ for indictments. The
Prosecutor should avoid or remove them.134 For example, the Trial Chamber in Nahimana listed
the following terms as lacking clarity when used in an indictment: “in or around”; “during the
time of events alleged in the indictment”; “from a date unknown to the Prosecutor”; “including
but not limited to”; “among others”; or “inter alia.”135
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It is likely that the language in Rule 68(B) reflects the meaning expressed through substantial
grounds to believe and the Prosecution can be guided by case law at the international criminal
courts on this issue. Rule 68(B) fails to use the phrase substantial grounds to believe but instead
states sufficient evidence that a suspect committed a crime.136 For instance, the Pre-Trial
Chamber at the ICC held that the threshold for “substantial grounds to believe” was not met
when Prosecution witnesses “contradict[ed]” each other and provide[d] testimony or statements
which were “inherently inconsistent.” Either the sufficient evidence that a suspect committed a
crime or substantial grounds to believe standard would have yielded the same decision. Since the
Article 18 of the STL Statutes applies the prima facie standard—and substantial grounds to
believe is explanatory of prima facie-- the Prosecutor should apply the prima facie analysis,
despite the slightly different text in Rule 68(B).
3. The Prosecutor should strive to establish a clear link between historical events (the
Hariri Attack) and the perpetrator(s).
Judge Cuno Tarfusser opined in Abu Garda that the Prosecution faces the burden of
establishing “a link between the historical events as charged and the alleged perpetrator.”137
Moreover, a pre-trial judge’s duty is to decline to confirm the charge “[w]henever the evidence
gathered by the Prosecutor…is flimsy, inconsistent or otherwise inadequate…”138 As a result, the
greater challenge for the Prosecutor at the STL is to prove the link between the accused and the
Hariri Attack through the production of evidence.
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When determining the degree of evidence needed to establish a prima facie case, the STL can
look to ICTY jurisprudence for guidance. In particular, several ICTY cases explain how specific
or proximate to the events evidence must be to establish a sufficient link between the accused
For example, the Karadzic Pre-Trial Chamber noted in Alleging Defects that the determination of
whether a fact is material “depends on the nature of the Prosecution’s case.”139 Moreover, the
“degree of specificity” required for each material fact depends on “the nature and scale” of the
crime charged and the “proximity of the accused to the relative events.”140 The ICTY Appeals
Chamber explained proximity this way:
“[a]s the proximity of the accused person to those events becomes more distant, less
precision is required in relation to those particular details, and greater emphasis is placed
upon the conduct of the accused person himself upon which the Prosecution relies to
establish his responsibility as an accessory or a superior to the persons who personally
committed the acts giving rise to the charges against him.”141
Considering that the STL is likely to seek indictments against perpetrators who are not
individually responsible for the actual physical attack against Hariri, the Prosecutor should focus
on the degree of specificity required and prepare to meet the requisite standard.
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4. The Prosecution can defeat defense motions that argue “defective indictments” by
submitting indictments that do not simply ‘repeat the wording [of the relevant
Statute] without providing further particulars of the alleged acts…’ but instead
describe the accused acts “precisely.”142
Precision and sufficient evidence to link the accused to the crime, are key factors to a
successful confirmation of the indictment. As a result, the Prosecution should error on the side of
precision when faced with the decision of whether to include information as to the identity of the
victims, the perpetrators or the manner in which the crimes were committed. Moreover, the
Prosecutor should note that an indictment pleaded in very general terms will not give adequate
notice to the accused of the nature of the case.143 Finally, for the STL, the Prosecutor should
prepare to respond to proximity questions since the Defense is likely raise concerns with any
charges filed under Rule 68(c) (“connected” to the Hariri Attack).
As noted, Rule 68(c) places a requirement on the Prosecution to submit “an
accompanying Connected Case Submission” with an indictment if the charges are related to “an
attack other than the Hariri Attack.”144 The rule also includes a requirement that any “connected”
indictment reach the “nature and gravity” similar to the Hariri Attack. The “connected” language
is likely to attract significant attention from defendants because the language in the Statute and
Rule appear to susceptible to broad interpretation. Furthermore, Defendants frequently raise
issues to the form of the indictment and are likely to put forth motions that the indictment is
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defective and must be dismissed because the indictment fails to “plead, or plead sufficiently, the
material facts as well as the type of connection between the material facts and the accused.”145
5. The Prosecution should note that dismissal is not the equivalent of acquittal.
If the reviewing judge fails to confirm all charges in an indictment, the Prosecutor can move
forward with the confirmed charges or amended the indictment. Moreoever, the Prosecutor
should note that declining an indictment is not the equivalent of an acquittal and therefore a new
indictment forwarded to the Registrar with additional evidence would most likely not violate any
‘double jeopardy’ rule.146
Rule 68 states that a reviewing judge may confirm or dismiss the indictment. If the judge
approves at least one count in the indictment, then the indictment should move forward to trial
and the Judge may issue, at the request of the Prosecutor, orders and warrants for the arrest of the
accused. 147 At the ICC, the Prosecutor sought an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar alBashir for charges which included genocide. On 4 March 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber rendered
the Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir. The Pre-Trial Chamber decided to issue an arrest warrant in respect of crimes
against humanity and war crimes," but rejected the Prosecutor's application in respect of the
145
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crime of genocide.148 Despite the rejection of the genocide charge, the arrest warrant moved
forward. Furthermore, the Prosecutor was offered the opportunity to appeal the decision of the
Pre-Trial Chamber. While the STL does not follow the same procedure as the ICC, if applied to
the STL, the Prosecutor would likely be given the opportunity to amend an indictment if certain
charge were dismissed.
6. The Prosecution should anticipate ex parte hearings, but also prepare for hearings
that include Defense witnesses.
Although the majority of international criminal courts hold confirmation hearings ex
parte, meaning without the suspect or his counsel, the STL Chambers could chose to follow
precedent set by the ICC and ECCC and include the defendant in the hearing process.149 At the
ICC, the confirmation hearing is just that—a hearing with both parties physically represented,
witnesses called and evidence admitted.150 At the ECCC, a defendant can put forth motions to
oppose Closing Orders to indict and also appeal a Closing Order. However, the Prosecution at
the STL is likely to follow the ICTY and ICTR confirmation process which excludes the
defendant; the reviewing judge will likely focus entirely on the accusatory instrument to make
his confirmation determination.
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7. The Prosecution should note that if the confirmation hearing is not ex parte, then the
Defense may benefit from early disclosure of Prosecution materials and evidence.
As exemplified at the ICC, one advantage for the Defense of attending a confirmation
hearing is that the Pre-Trial Chamber may make orders concerning disclosure of information for
the purposes of the hearing.151 William Schabas notes that, in theory, at the ICC “the
confirmation hearing is held in public,152 although parts of it may take place in closed session (in
camera) in order to protect witnesses.”153 Normally, at the ICC, the hearing is held in the
presence of the accused as well as his or her counsel. Schabas writes that “[t]he confirmation
hearing seems to resemble preliminary hearings held under common law procedure” and that the
hearing serves the purpose of ensuring that a “prosecution is not frivolous,” thus protecting the
accused from prosecutorial abuse. Moreover, Schabas explains, for the Defendant, the hearing
process at the ICC “provides a useful opportunity to see important evidence in the possession of
the prosecution and even test the value of such evidence, at least in a superficial way, during a

Schabas, ICC, 275, (2004). The pre-trial confirmation hearing resembles in some ways the ‘Rule 61 Procedure’
adopted by the ad hoc tribunals. In the early days, when there was little real trial work because few accused had been
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judicial proceeding.”154 Therefore, if the STL adopts a procedure more closely mirroring the
ICC, then the Prosecutor should be aware of the benefits to the Defense of early disclosure.
8. The Prosecution should prepared to face a focused reviewing judge.
The STL deviates from the ICTY and ICTR confirmation process in one novel way: the
Pre-Trial Judge “is not a member of the trial bench, but rather a “separate and
autonomous”155 Judge, who cannot sit on the Trial Chamber (see Article 2 of the Agreement
between the UN and Lebanon and Articles 7(a) and 18 of the Statute).”156 According to
analysis in the STL’s 2009-2010 Annual Report, the STL Pre-Trial Judge may not become a
member of the Trial Chamber. In this way he avoids becoming “contaminated” by contact
with the evidence. The Annual Report further notes that “the STL Pre-Trial Judge is free to
deal with evidentiary material submitted by the parties and may take a more active role
during the initial stages of proceedings.”157
9. The STL’s Prosecutor should seek an arrest warrant after the indictment is
confirmed.
Most international criminal courts issue an arrest warrant only after the indictment has been
confirmed; although the ICC and ECCC deviate from this practice. The ICC permits the
Prosecution to request an accused to appear, via summons, at a confirmation hearing prior to the
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indictment being confirmed.158 At the ECCC, the Co-Investigating Judge, with the approval of
the Co-Prosecuting Judge, can issue warrants of arrest prior to the final approval of a Closing
Order.159
In common law systems a preliminary hearing determines whether an accused should
stand trial after arrest at which time accused will be permitted to challenge the case alleged. The
Trial Chamber in Kordic asserted that, at least for the ICTY, the process of confirming the
indictment prior to the arrest of an accused should be interpreted as subsuming the right to
challenge the lawfulness of the arrest on jurisdictional basis.160 As a result, the confirmation
process provides the Prosecutor with stronger footing when seeking arrest and therefore it is
advised that an arrest be sought only after the indictment is confirmed.
10. The Prosecutor should favor shorter over longer indictments.
The international criminal courts favor shorter over longer indictments. For example, at
the ICTR, the Prosecutor originally drafted long and complex indictments; the longest was for
108 pages.161 However, it is “readily acknowledged” now that shorter indictments are often
“precise, clear and unambiguous”, and this has the effect of limiting the number of preliminary
motions filed by defense counsel after confirmation of indictments.162
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11. Prosecutors should anticipate Defense motions arguing that indictments are defective
Unlike the ICC, the STL rules do not permit the Defense to submit motions during the
confirmation hearing since the Pre-Trial Judge only hears from the Prosecution.163 However, in
order to defeat Defense motions arguing defects in the indictment, the Prosecutor should (i) meet
the established pleading requirements, and (ii) consider and plead the proper form of the
indictment.
12. The Prosecution’s indictments should meet the established pleading requirements to
defeat motions raising defects in the indictment.
Defendants frequently raise issues to the form of the indictment and are likely to put forth
motions that the indictment fails to “plead, or plead sufficiently, the material facts as well as the
type of connection between the material facts and the accused.”164 In subsection 13, this paper
lists an example of a pleading requirement the Defense is likely to raise; for an exhaustive list of
pleading requirements referenced in jurisprudence at the ICTR, along with each case citation,
see: Human Rights Watch, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: A Digest of
Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, (2010) found in the appendix of
this paper.165
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13. Defense motions often claim that charges and material facts were not pleaded with
sufficient precision to provide notice to the Accused.

When Prosecutors fail to plead indictments with precision, the Appeals Chambers have
shown a willingness to overturn convictions. For example, at the ICTY, Zoran and Mirjan
Kupreskic were convicted by the Trial Chamber but the Appeals Chambers acquitted them of
charges because the indictment was framed in a “general way” and therefore failed to “fulfill the
fundamental purpose of providing the accused with a description of the charges against [them]
with sufficient particularity to enable [them] to mount a defense.”166
At the ICTR, the Appeals Chambers has repeatedly held that the pleading standard for
indictments is that “[t]he charges against an accused and the material facts supporting those
charges must be pleaded with sufficient precision in an indictment so as to provide notice to the
accused.”167 In Ntakirutimana, the Appeals Chamber “quashed” several findings of fact by the
Trial Chamber because “the prosecution failed to plead specific crucial facts relating to the
(v) pleading identity of victims and manner and means of attack; (vi) pleading knowledge of crimes and failure to
prevent and/or to punish; (vii) application—pleading 6(3); (q) pleading mens rea; (i) pleading mens rea for
genocide; (r) pleading conspiracy to commit genocide; (i) may not rely on allegations pled regarding other counts;
(ii) evidence of meetings not properly pled as to conspiracy may be relevant to other allegations properly pled (iii)
application; (s) discrepancies/vagueness; (i) minor discrepancies acceptable, as long as not prejudicial to the
defense; (ii) discrepancies/vagueness as to dates; (iii) discrepancies/vagueness as to location; (t) aggravating factors
must be pled; (u) accused not given notice by factual allegations in other indictment where joint trial (v) error for
Trial Chamber to view evidence where no adequate notice; (w) prosecution should remove facts it does not intend to
prove. Alex Obote-Odora, Drafting of Indictments, 335-358, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB 43].
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alleged acts and conduct of the accused”, one of which, murder, was the basis for a genocide
charge.168
A final example occurred in Prosecutor v. Kvocka at the ICTY. In that instance, the
Appeals Chamber noted that the prosecution failed to plead the material facts necessary to
support each mode of responsibility. 169 As the Appeals Chamber highlighted, “despite pleading
‘ordering’ as a mode of responsibility, the indictment d[id] not include any material facts which
allege[d] that any Accused ordered the commission of any particular crime on any occasion.”170
14. The Prosecution should also anticipate pre-trial Defense motions arguing that
indictments are defective in form.
Likewise to raising issues with the precision of material facts pleaded, Defendants
frequently raise issues as to the form of the indictment. A Prosecutor can defeat such defenses by
submitting indictments that do not simply “repeat the wording [of the relevant Statute] without
providing further particulars of the alleged acts…” but instead describe the accused acts
“precisely.” 171 More specifically, Gideon Boas in this book The Milosevic Trial argues that a
growing collection of jurisprudence supports defense motions arguing for defective indictments
when those indictments fail to plead material facts relevant to each form of responsibility alleged
in the indictment. For example, the Appeals Chambers reviewed the indictment in Blaskic and
found that “the prosecution should have pleaded the particular forms of participation under
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Article 7(1) with respect to each incident under each count” and not simply repeated the wording
of Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.172
If the Prosecution at STL seeks to argue that the accused did not “physically” commit any
of the crimes alleged but instead argue that the accused participated in a joint criminal enterprise
as co-perpetrators, then the Prosecution should plead (i) “the specific conduct that supports the
bare averment that the accused acted in each or any of the ways in which individual criminal
responsibility may be attributable to the accused” or (ii) state that it was inviting the Chamber to
infer that the Accused acted in one or more of the ways established in the Statute from the
conduct of the forces over whom he exercised authority...” and (iii) specify the state of mind
required for each of the various forms of responsibility.173 For example, in Lazarevic, the Trial
Chamber held found that “if the prosecution wished to infer that the accused…participated in a
joint criminal enterprise…from the conduct of the forces over whom he exercised authority it
[failed] to explicitly plead this.”174 Therefore, the Prosecutor faces the burden of showing the
links between not only the conduct of the accused but his or her relationship to those individually
responsible if such a scenario is present.
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IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Prosecutors face more sophisticated defenses and more stringent judges when submitting
indictments for confirmation. As a result, the Prosecutor must overcome the higher scrutiny by
drafting an indictment that is both short and concise, but also provides enough detail about the
accused’s conduct so as to notify the defendant of the charges against him. In this way, the prima
facie standard and the jurisprudence of the international criminal courts act as guides for the
Prosecution.
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